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The Detector Safety System (DSS), currently being developed at CERN under the auspices of the Joint Controls Project 
(JCOP), will be responsible for assuring the protection of equipment for the four LHC experiments. Thus, the DSS will require 
a high degree of both availability and reliability. After evaluation of various possible solutions, a prototype is being built based 
on a redundant Siemens PLC front-end, to which the safety-critical part of the DSS task is delegated. This is then supervised by 
a PVSS SCADA system via an OPC server. The PLC front-end is capable of running autonomously and of automatically 
taking predefined protective actions whenever required. The supervisory layer provides the operator with a status display and 
with limited online reconfiguration capabilities. Configuration of the code running in the PLCs will be completely data driven 
via the contents of a “Configuration Database”. Thus, the DSS can easily adapt to the different and constantly evolving 
requirements of the LHC experiments during their construction, commissioning and exploitation phases. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Detector Safety System (DSS) project covers one of 
the grey areas that still existed in the development process 
of the LHC1 experiments at CERN: equipment protection. 
For the last large CERN accelerator project (LEP2) 
experiment safety on all levels was ensured by one single 
system, whereas for the LHC it was decided to delegate 
the responsibility for the highest level of safety3 to a 
CERN-wide system, the CERN Safety System (CSS). 
Normal operation of the detectors is performed using the 
corresponding detector control systems (DCS), which also 
handles low level safety, e.g. the overheating of crates. 
This left an area of uncertainty, especially as the 
availability and reliability of a PC-based control system 
does not seem to be sufficient to ensure proper equipment 
protection. 
At the beginning of 2001, the four LHC experiments 
produced a working document defining requirements for a 
system assuring equipment protection for the valuable, and 
sometimes irreplaceable, detectors. The outcome of this is 
the DSS. 
2. SCOPE AND GOALS OF A DETECTOR 
SAFETY SYSTEM 
The main goal of the DSS is to detect abnormal and 
potentially harmful situations, and to minimize the 
consequent damage to the experimental equipment by 
taking “protective actions”. By implementing this strategy, 
a reduction of the occurrence of higher level alarms with 
more serious consequences can be expected, and therefore 
an increase of the experiment’s running time and 
efficiency. The Detector Safety System should 
complement and not duplicate existing systems, such as 
the Detector Control System and the CERN Safety 
System. By working together in a complementary manner, 
these three systems will ensure that situations that may 
lead to equipment damage, or place people in danger, are 
well covered. 
3. REQUIREMENTS AND GENERAL 
ARCHITECTURE 
As a consequence of the above mentioned goals, the 
following main requirements were defined for the DSS. It 
has to be 
• highly reliable and available, as well as simple and 
robust, 
• provide a cost-effective solution for experimental 
safety, 
• operate permanently and independently of the state 
of DCS and CSS, 
• able to take immediate actions to protect the 
equipment, 
• scalable, so that it may evolve with the experiments 
during their assembly, commissioning, operation 
and dismantling (a time-span of approximately 20 
years), 
• maintainable over the lifetime of the experiments, 
• configurable, so that changes in the setup can be 
accounted for, 
• able to connect to all sub-systems and sub-detector 
safety systems, and  
• integrated into the DCS, so that existing tools can 
be reused, the same look & feel is presented to all 
users, and the monitoring, logging and presenting 
are standardized. 
Taking all these requirements into account, the DSS will 
consist of three main entities: 
                                                 
1 Large Hadron Collider, accelerator currently being built at 
CERN. 
2 The Large Electron Positron collider finished physics running 
in 2000. 
3 According to CERN rules there are three alarm levels (1-3); 
level 3 is defined as “accident or serious abnormal situation, 
especially where people’s lives are, or may be, in danger” [1]. 
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1. The “Back-end”, which constitutes the User 
Interface of the DSS, and which is based on the 
PVSS4 SCADA5 system and the JCOP Framework 
tools, is used for configuration, monitoring and 
logging, user interfaces, and as gateway to external 
information. 
2. The “Front-end”, to which the safety critical part of 
the DSS task is delegated, is built of highly reliable 
hardware, and can act upon hardwired information 
coming from dedicated sensors or from external 
systems (e.g. CSS). It is composed of several 
Detector Safety Units (DSU). Each DSU is 
responsible for a distinct geographical area. The 
inter-communication between the Front-end and the 
Back-end is performed through a dedicated OPC 
server / gateway. 
3. The DSS sensors, which collect temperature, 
humidity and other physical parameters, as well as 
status information from various sub-detectors and 
external systems. 
A complete overview of the DSS inside the detector 
control system architecture is shown in  
Figure 1
 
 
Figure 1: How the Detector Safety System integrates within the experimental control infrastructure. 
• the equipment that is acted upon by DCS, DSS, and 
CSS, subdivided here into two parts, the primary 
services (e.g. power, water, and primary gas supply) 
and the equipment under control of the experiment 
(e.g. sub-detectors, racks, and gas systems), 
• the DCS, which is a coherent control system 
running PVSS on the supervisory and sub-system 
levels together with their own front-end parts. This 
includes the infrastructure control system, which 
controls racks, etc., together with its own sensors, 
e.g. temperature sensors inside the racks. The DCS 
might take corrective action to maintain normal 
operation. 
• the CSS together with its own sensors, taking all 
required safety actions (e.g. calling the fire brigade) 
in case of an alarm of level 3. The CSS is required 
by law, and conforms to relevant International, 
European, and National standards. 
• the DSS, consisting of a back-end and a front-end 
together with its own sensors and which is 
embedded in the Experiment’s DCS, 
• the Technical Services, providing the primary 
services (power, water, and gas), . It is composed of the following entities: 
• the Data Interchange Protocol (DIP), that provides 
information exchange between the experiments, the 
LHC machine, the technical services, and the CSS. 
                                                 
4 Prozeß-Visualisierungs- und Steuerungs-System made by ETM 
AG, Austria; www.etm-ag.at 
5 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
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All parts of the Front-end are compliant to the relevant 
safety norms.  
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
The DSS implementation distinguishes between a Front-
end, to which the safety-critical part of the DSS task is 
delegated, and a Back-end, which supervises the Front-end 
though a SCADA system. Their inter-communication is 
performed through a dedicated OPC6 server / gateway. The 
general layout for a typical experiment is shown  
Figure 2
 
Figure 2: General DSS Hardware Layout 
4.1.1.  The PLC 
The core of the DSS Front-end is the redundant PLC 
system S7-400 H from Siemens8. Each CPU of the 
redundancy pair scans the input signals of the DSS digital 
and analog inputs attached to the PLC system. Both CPUs 
run the same DSS Process Code and determine the state of 
the outputs (the DSS actuators) according to a set of rules 
defined by the user – the “Alarm-Action-Matrix”. This 
sequence (scanning, processing, and output control) is 
repeated periodically and is named the “PLC cycle”. The 
cycle time for a typical experiment is of the order of 500 
ms, depending on the complexity of the Alarm-Action-
Matrix and the number of sensors and actuators.  Thus the 
reaction time of the DSS to an event is below one second. 
Parts of the DSS Process Code and the corresponding 
data blocks can be modified without disturbing the DSS 
operation itself. Therefore, the DSS software can evolve to 
cover future needs. 
The CPU internal state, the input values and the results 
of intermediate processing steps of both CPUs are 
monitored and compared regularly during a PLC cycle, by 
the redundancy process. Differences result in a shutdown 
of the faulty CPU, which does not affect the DSS itself as 
the second CPU continues to perform the DSS monitoring 
task. 
.  
4.1. Front-end Architecture Each of the two redundant CPUs is mounted in a crate 
together with redundant power supplies and Ethernet 
communication. To achieve synchronization, Siemens 
interconnects the two CPUs via four (non-redundant) 
optical fibers. Common time synchronization of both 
CPUs is achieved by connecting them to the network time 
server at CERN via NTP9. 
The Front-end must be capable of running 
autonomously and of automatically taking predefined 
protective actions whenever required. Its design must be as 
simple and robust as possible, but at the same time highly 
reliable and available. 
The standard used for such applications in industry is 
“Programmable Logic Controllers” (PLCs). The DSS 
implementation follows this approach, using a redundant 
PLC system from Siemens7 which is certified for Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) 2 applications. In such systems, the 
two CPUs constantly monitor and compare their internal 
states and their communication lines, and automatically 
detect abnormalities. In the event of a problem, only the 
“good” branch continues to operate. 
Several external crates make up the interface to the DSS 
sensors and actuators through I/O modules. Each external 
crate can hold up to eight I/O modules. Since both, sensors 
and actuators are widely spread over caverns and the 
surface of the experiment’s site, the external crates act as 
cable concentrators to minimize sensor/actuator cable 
length.  
Up to 32 external crates can be connected to both CPUs 
via a redundant cable pair using the PROFIbus protocol. 
Thus, redundancy is achieved down to the level of 
PROFIbus communication. The I/O modules themselves 
are not redundant, but sensors or actuators can be 
connected in a redundant fashion by simply doubling their 
number. External crates and/or their modules can be 
connected during DSS operation. 
 The status of the experiment’s equipment is continually 
monitored by digital and analog sensors (e.g. PT100 for 
temperature measurement, humidity sensors, and status 
signals of sub-detectors). All values are filtered and 
checked. Required actions are determined automatically 
and immediately by the PLC and taken by DSS actuators 
(in this case, usually by cutting the electrical power). The 
sensors and actuators are dedicated to the DSS. Only 
hardwired sensors are considered to be safe, since 
networked information can not be guaranteed to be 
reliable. 
4.1.2.  The Detector Safety Units 
The Detector Safety Unit (DSU) is an assembly of the 
above mentioned crates installed in a standard 52 U high 
rack. This assembly contains the infrastructure to connect 
                                                 
                                                 
8 The DSS uses the CPU 414-4H, the CP443-1 Ethernet 
communications processor, and the ET 200M external crates with 
IM153-2 communication modules. 6 OLE for Process Control 
7 Siemens AG, Germany; www.ad.siemens.com 9 Network Time Protocol 
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The patch panel terminals from WAGO10 allow for an 
easy connection of different types of digital and analog 
sensors. All digital channels are galvanically isolated from 
each other and from the I/O modules by the use of opto-
couplers. Modifications (i.e. adding or removing extra 
sensors or actuators) can be made during the running of 
the DSS, and do not interrupt the operation itself. 
Threehundredfiftytwo digital sensors and actuators or 
120 analog sensors can be connected to one DSU in total. 
In the case of the digital channels, the limitations are the 
space constraints inside the rack and the width of the 
chosen type of WAGO patch panel terminals. Eleven 
digital I/O modules with up to 32 channels can be handled. 
The number of analog channels is limited by the number 
of free slots in the external crates. 
All digital sensors and actuators follow the “Positive 
Safety” rule. The normal condition is signaled by a “high” 
level (16-24V), while alarm conditions give “low” levels 
(0-5V). In case of a broken wire, the PLC automatically 
assumes an alarm condition. Actuators are powered 
through normally/closed contact relays, which open in the 
case of an alarm. Short-circuits or broken wires in the 
analog sensors are detected by abnormal readings. 
4.1.4.  Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) 
Each DSU is backed-up by an uninterruptible power 
supply from APC11. Additional battery-packs allow each 
DSU to be independent of the general power network for 
at least one hour. This is agreed to be sufficient to bridge  
Figure 3: Hardware Layout of a Detector Safety Unit. sensors and actuators via patch panels, as well as display 
LEDs for monitoring purposes, and also allows the 
connection to the Ethernet. Each DSU is capable of 
monitoring is own state by the use of internal sensors and 
a dedicated I/O module. 
At least one DSU is located on the surface and another 
in the underground experimental cavern, so that the two 
CPUs can be separated to minimize the danger of 
accidental damage.  The location and the number of DSUs 
is chosen to minimize the cable installation. 
The layout of all DSUs is the same (see  
Figure 3
the latency until the start of a diesel backed-up power 
network. 
The UPS provides the redundant 24V power supplies of 
a CPU crate as well as a second pair of redundant 24V 
power supplies, which deliver the current to all external 
crates and to the sensors and actuators. A power 
distribution module allows for current limiting to different 
sets of consumers. 
 
4.2. The OPC Server and Communication 
The communication between Front-end and Back-end is 
routed through a dedicated 1 U high rack-mounted PC12 
acting as a gateway. In addition to a 3COM network card, 
this PC possesses a special Siemens Ethernet adapter 
(CP1613) to handle the redundancy of the CPUs: this 
adapter communicates with both CPUs using ISO 
protocol. Thus the twofold communication path from the 
CPUs to the PC is hidden to any external user. 
). The lower half of the rack is dedicated to the 
patch panel assembly. The upper half hosts an 
uninterruptible power supply, the OPC server, the CPU 
crate and two external crates at maximum (this limits the 
number of DSUs to 16). Only two DSUs contain a CPU 
crate, and only one the OPC server. 
4.1.3.  Patch Panels 
As a large number of sensors can be connected to the 
DSU, adequate space for cabling is essential. Twenty-six 
units of rack space inside of the DSU for the patch panel 
was found to be the optimal solution for serving two 
external crates or fifteen I/O modules that can be inserted 
in one DSU (two external crates times eight slots, minus 
one slot reserved for the dedicated monitoring module). 
Each digital module can handle up to 32 channels; each 
analog module up to eight channels. 
The communication is performed on a dedicated DSS 
network (DSS COM) using common Ethernet switches. 
                                                 
10 WAGO Kontakttechnik GmbH, Germany; www.wago.com 
11 American Power Conversion Corp. (APC), U.S.A.; 
www.apc.com. The DSS uses the APC Smart UPS online 
1000VA (APC SUOL1000XLI) with one battery packet (APC 
SUOL48XLBP) and relay I/O module (APC AP-9610). 
12 Supermicro Computer Inc., U.S.A.; www.supermicro.com. 
The DSS uses the Supermicro SuperServer 5013G-i. 
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The communication with the Back-end uses the standard 
CERN network (CERN LAN) connected to the 3COM 
card.  
The data exchange with the Back-end follows the OPC 
standard [2]. All information exchanged between the PLC 
and the Back-end is handled by an OPC server running on 
the gateway PC.  
4.3. Back-end Architecture 
The Back-end acts as user interface for the operators in 
the experiment control rooms and will display the 
information, acquired via the Front-end, as well as 
supplementary information acquired via the network. In 
addition, it will also show the procedures to be followed, 
as well as help screens. Furthermore, it will also assist the 
experts in modifying the safety-related behavior of the 
Front-end. 
The Back-end is implemented using the PVSS SCADA 
system. Although all safety-critical aspects are 
concentrated in the Front-end part, the Back-end 
configuration functionality also has a role for safety in 
limiting the possibilities for operator input errors. This is 
carried out via an expert-system-like approach that allows 
for context analysis and testing to be performed before the 
download of the new configuration to the Front-end. 
The Back-end uses the PVSS database to store the 
current configuration of the system, while it is planned to 
store all the modification history into an Oracle Database. 
This Oracle database will also be used to log the history of 
all the values of the input channels defined in the system, 
together with all the alarms detected and the protective 
actions consequently taken. All the user actions will also 
be logged. 
The operator will be alerted whenever a new alarm is 
detected. He will have to acknowledge the alarms, and to 
reset them, once the abnormal situation which triggered 
the alarm has gone. Subsequently, the operator will be able 
to take the required actions (probably via the DCS) to 
bring the detector back into operation. 
To ease the work and the understanding of the operator, 
help pages are foreseen for every alarm, as well as detailed 
synoptic displays representing the geographical layout of 
the experiments, and the localization of the alarms and the 
sensors which generated them. 
Finally, the Back-end will also be capable of issuing 
warnings, so that the operator can react in advance to 
developing situations that could eventually evolve into full 
alarms. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It has been shown that the initial requirements for the 
Detector Safety System for the LHC experiments could be 
fulfilled with a relatively simple and robust system. The 
prototype of the Front-end part has been built, and the 
Back-end software part is in progress. 
This system will undergo a review in the very near 
future and, afterwards, the final series production will 
start. In total about 18 DSUs will be built and deployed to 
the experimental areas in the coming two years, starting in 
mid-summer 2003. 
The costs for one complete DSS depend largely on the 
experiment’s needs, but are in the order of 50000 to 70000 
Euros (sensors, actuators and their cabling are excluded). 
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